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I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ETHEL M. GIBBONS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
OREM CI TY CORPORATION, 
and GARY SCOTT CRAWFORD, 
Defendants and Respondents 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 
) 12476 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for 
personal injuries suffered by plaintiff 
when an 0 rem City dump truck co 11 i ded 
into her vehicle while she was making a 
left-hand turn at the intersection of 
State Street and 800 North in Orem City, 
Utah. This action was brought against 
-1 -
the driver of the truck, an Orem City· 
employee driving the dump truck in the 
course of his employment, and against 
Orem City under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act Sections 63-30-1 through 
63-30-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court after memorandums of· 
law were submitted and after hearing 
arguments granted defendants• motion 
for summary judgment on the ground that 
the evidence was conclusive as a matter 
of law that the plaintiff Ethel M. 
Gibbons was negligent and that her 
negligence was a proximate contributing 
cause of the collision and her resulting 
i injuries. 
~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
-2-
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal 
and remand for an opportunity to present 
her claim upon trial to a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is based upon 
the records submitted to this court in the 
case of Ethel M. Gibbons v. Orem City 
Corporation· and Gary Scott Crawford and 
Lynn Sorensen et al. v. Orem City and 
Gary Scott Crawford. Lynn Sorensen is 
the son of Mrs. May Sorensen, a passenger 
in the vehicle driven by Ethel M. Gibbons; 
the two cases having been consolidated 
for trial upon the motion of the defendants. 
On October 7, 1968, Mrs. Ethel M. 
Gibbons was driving south on State Street 
in Orem City with her passenger'Mrs. May 
Sorensen. As she approached the intersection 
-3-
at 800 North, she stopped in the collecting, 
inside lane, preparatory to making a left 
turn toward Provo Canyon. When the light 
turned green, she proceeded into her turn. 
When she was approximately two-thirds of 
the way through the intersection, her car 
was struck broadside by the dump truck 
of defendant Orem City which was traveling 
in a northerly direction on State Street. 
The defendant 1 s truck skidded a distance 
of about 61 feet before striking the 
Gibbons vehicle and the impact killed the 
passenger, May Sorensen, and seriously 
injured the plaintiff, demolishing her 
sma 11 car. 
The area where the accident occurred 
was in a business district (R. 157). 
Mrs. Gibbons• car was the first one in 
-4-
line waiting for the light to turn green, 
when it turned green, she testified that 
she looked to the south and to the east 
and saw no traffic that would endanger 
her (R. 141 and Dep. p. 8). 
Measurements were taken by Officer 
Nielson and Trooper Blackhurst (R. 143, 155). 
From a sutdy of this information a physicis't, 
Dr. Daniel w. Miles and Captain E. M. 
Pitcher, each made studies (R. 178, 
171). These studies show that the dump 
truck was traveling north at a rate of 
between 40 ~:ind 48 miles per hour. Dr. 
Daniel w. Miles also calculated that 
Mrs. Gibbons• automobile was 64% through 
the intersection when struck by the dump 
truck. When Mrs. Gibbons entered the 
intersection, the truck was approximately 
350 feet back from the intersection. 
-5 -
A vehicle driven by one Boyd Erickson 
was stopped on the opposite side of the 
intersection in the inside lane. The 
Erickson vehicle in its position obscured 
the dump truck, and when Mrs. Gibbons 
looked to the south she could not see the 
truck. 
Defendant Crawford stated in his 
affidavit: 
11 I do not know my speed * ·k * 
since the speedometer on the truck 
registers from 40 to 60 miles per 
hour at all times when the vehicle 
is in motion*** I would guess 
my speed to be well within the speed 
limit. As I approached the inter-
section, the light changed from red 
to green in my direction, and I 
then looked in my rear view mirrors 
to ascertain if there was any 
traffic behind me. When I looked 
forward again, a Ford was moving 
directly into my lane of traffic 
making a left turn onto 8th North 
* * * I applied my brakes * * * 
and slid into this vehicle*** I 
-6-
first detected the vehicle when I 
was approximately 70 to 75 feet 
from it*** There were automobiles 
on either side of my truck and I 
could neither move left nor 
right. 11 (R. 57). 
That night at the hospital where Mrs. 
Gibbons was taken Mr. Crawford admitted 
tc- the witness, Wallace Larson, he had 
looked into 11 my rear view mi rrors_, 11 and 
that 11 the s peedome te r reading in the truck 
was less than the actual speed of the 
truck. 11 As a result of his, he stated 
to me that he could be in trouble for 
speeding. He also said to me that as 
1e approached the intersection there was 
l ~ssenger car to his left which was 
llmost to the intersection. (R. 167, 177). 
The truck skidded 61 feet 5 inches 
1efore impact, and, locked to the Gibbons 
-6a-
car, skidded another 28 feet 10 inche~ 
after impact. Officer Nielson stated the 
11 overal l or a total skid of the truck was 
9 0 fee t 2 i n ch es * -1, * 11 ( R • 1 5 6 ) • M-r • 
Crawford told Trooper Blackhurst, "the 
brakes were not as good as they should 
have been ;'( -1, ;'( 11 ( R. 144). 
The actual course of the skidding 
truck and the skid marks are shown in 
photographs taken of the accident, and 
these photographs also show that Mr. 
Crawford would be able to see out over 
a passenger car such as the Erickson 
vehicle (R. 166, 167). 
A vehicle driven by Michael S. 
Christensen was following plaintiff 
two cars to the rear. Mr. Christensen 
also intended to make a left hand turn. 
-7-
In his affidavit he stated that he saw 
nothing in the intersection in the way of 
traffic prior to hearing the screech of 
the dump truck's brakes. He stated that 
the plaintiff was traveling from 5 to 10 
miles per hour in making what he regarded 
as a 11 normal left turn 11 (R. 142). 
The plaintiff stated in her affidavit 
that: 
11 As I approached my left turn to go 
east on 8th North, I looked into the 
intersection. I saw no traffic or 
vehicles in or approaching the 
intersection that in my judgment 
would interfere with my making the 
l e f t t u r n . I n eve r s aw th e t ruck 
that hit me. My bl inker signal was 
on for my left turn*** I waited 
for the light to turn green for me, 
and I then made a cautious left turn 
feeling at the time there was no 
danger in the intersection** *11 
(R. 141). 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting 
-8-
2.Qmmary judgment on the grounds that 
~aintiff was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. 
Rule S6(c) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure as applicable in the case at hand 
provides as follows: 
"The judgment sought shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. 11 
In order for the trial court to have 
correctly granted summary judgment against 
plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues 
as to material facts. It is the well 
established rule that a summary judgment 
can only be granted when under the facts 
viewed in the 1 ight most favorable to the. 
plaintiff, he has no right to recovery and 
-9-
any doubts must be resolved in favor of 
permitting him to go to trial. This rule 
has been stated in substance in numerous 
Utah cases. In Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 
2nd 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959), the court in 
commenting upon when a summary judgment 
should be granted said: 
11 Summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy and the Court should be 
reluctant to deprive litigants of 
an opportunity to fully present 
their contention upon a trial. It 
should be granted only when under the 
facts viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff he could 
not recover as a matter of law. 11 
[Emphasis added]. 
A ft' A C-tJ//]JA 
See also Housley v. Andecon Company, 
19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967); 
Controll<':,.{_Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 
Utah 2d 420, 413 P. 2d 807 ( 1 966) ; and 
l.angren v. Ingalls, 12 Utah 2d 388, 367 
p. 2 d l 7 9 ( 1 96 l ) • 
-1 0-
In addition to the severity of summary 
judgments and the reluctance of courts in 
granting them, it is also a well established 
rule that the court on appeal in reviewing 
such judgments will consider all of the 
facts presented and every inference 
arising therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the appealing party. Abdul kadi r v. 
Western Pacific Railroad Company, 7 Utah 2d 
53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957) arose out of an 
accident involving a speeding passenger 
train which struck and killed a woman 
eras sing the rail road tracks. In addressing 
itself to the issue of whether the 
summary judgment from which the plaintiff 
appealed was properly granted, the court 
said: 
11 The pertinent inquiry is whether 
under any view of the facts, a 
plaintiff could recover, It is 
- l l -
acknowledged that in the face of 
a motion for dismissal or summary 
judgment, the plaintiff is entitled 
to have the trial court, and this 
court on review, consider all of the 
evidence which plaintiff is able 
to present, and every inference and 
intendment fairly arising there-
from in the light most favorable 
to him. 11 [Emphasis added] . 
See also, Young v. Texas Company, 8 
Utah 2nd 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 
259 P. 2d 297 ( 1953); and Auto Lease Company 
v. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 7 Utah 
2nd 3 3 6, 3 25 P. 2d 264 ( l 95 8) . 
The facts looked at in the record 
most favorably for the plaintiff show 
that the plaintiff was moving cautiously 
through the intersection in a 1 eft turn. 
She did not see the dump truck because 
it was about 350 feet down the road, and 
was obstructed by the Erickson car. The 
-1 2-
dump truck was exceeding the speed limit 
and was moving between 40 and 48 rn i l es per 
hour. The plaintiff was 64% through the 
intersection when hit by the truck. She 
states in her deposition that it was her 
intention to make a left turn; that she 
had her left turn signal working; when 
the light turned g~een, she looked to the 
east in the direction she was going to 
go and that she looked to the south, the 
direction from which the dump truck came. 
(Dep. 7, 9, 19. Aff. R. 141). The vehicle 
cir i ven by Boyd Erickson was approaching 
in the innermost lane of the northbound 
traffic. It is ambiguous from the record 
whether Mrs. Gibbons saw the Erickson 
vehicle approaching. It is clear that 
she did not see the Orem City dump truck. 
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Mrs. Gibbons testified in her deposition 
as fo 11 ows : 
"Question: Did you see any vehicles 
come into the intersection going 
North which might interfere with 
your path or the path your car was 
going? 
Answer: did not. 
Question: Did you see the truck which 
struck your car before the coll is ion 
occurred? 
Answer: did not. 11 (p. 8). 
A reading of the entire record on 
appeal wi 11 show that Mrs. Gibbons has not 
been asked directly whether she saw the 
Erickson vehicle, but she was asked the 
general question of whether she saw any 
cars which would interfere with her making 
a left-hand turn: 
"Question: From the time you started 
your car until you had stopp~d for 
the 1 ight and the light had changed 
to green, from the time you started 
-14-
your car, did you see any other cars 
in the intersection at all until the 
coll is ion occurred? 
Answer: I never saw any that would 
hinder my making the turn and going 
through my lane of traffic.~ 
The affidavit of the witness Christensen 
states that plaintiff was moving in her 
left turn at the rate of 5 to 10 miles per 
hour. It was calculated by the physicist 
Miles that she was 64% through the inter-
sect'ion (R. 179), over 80 feet into the 
intersection when she was hit broadside 
by the dump truck. The computation 
was made th a t th e dump t ruck was a pp r ox i -
mately 350 feet from the intersection 
at the time Mrs. Gibbons started her turn 
( R. l 7 9 ) . F r om these facts , i t can be 
fairly inferred that when Mrs. Gibbons 
looked to see if any vehicles were 
approaching before she started her turn she 
-15 -
could see no vehicles approaching that would 
interfere with making the turn, and that 
she exercised that degree of care which a 
reasonable and prudent person would use 
under the circumstances. Michael s. 
Christensen stated in his affidavit (R. 142) 
that the plaintiff's car was two cars ahead 
of him; that he also was going to make a 
left-hand turn, and that: 
11 I was aw a re t hat th i s ca r i n the 
lead had a green light and saw it 
start and proceed into a left turn 
and proceed on 8th North. To the best 
of my recollection, this car was 
traveling between five and ten miles 
per hour as it made a left turn. I 
was anxious to make the same light. 
The next thing I remember was hearing 
the screech of brakes and I saw the 
on-coming dump truck and I knew it 
was going to hit the car I have above 
described. I saw the collision. I 
was unaware of any other traffic in 
the intersection because my attention 
was focused on the on-coming dump truck 
that I could see was surely going to 
hit the small car*** This car 
(the plaintiff's) made a normal 
-16-
left turn without incident making 
no impression on me until I heard 
the screech of the brakes as above. 
Prior to hearing the above screeching 
noise, I saw nothing in the inter-
section which would indicate to me 
that there might be an accident. 11 
The courts have recognized that in tort 
actions involving issues of negligence, 
contributory negligence and causation, 
the rule of granting summary judgment 
only when there is no genuine issue as to 
material facts is even more strictly applied 
than in other cases such as contracts and 
other situations where there is greater 
ease in determining the factual issues. 
This rule was recognized in the case of 
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2nd 292, 
431 P.2d 126 (1967) which arose out of 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a 
slip and fall accident in a laundromat. 
In discussing the considerations involved 
in granting summary judgment in tort actions 
-1 7 -
the court said: 
It will be noted that a summary judg-
ment can be granted only when it is 
shown that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the 
moving party also is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under 
those facts. The court cannot 
consider the weight of testimony or 
the creditability of witnesses in 
considering a motion for summary 
judgment. He simply determines 
that there is no disputed issue of 
material fact and that as a matter 
of law, a party should prevail. 
11 Summary judgment is more frequently 
given in contract cases because of 
greater ease in determining the 
factual issues. In tort claims 
defendants frequently rely on 
affirmative defenses of accord and 
satisfaction, res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, etc., and such defenses are 
just as easy to establish as are 
matters of contract. However, when it 
comes to determining negligence, 
contributory negligence, and causation, 
courts are not in such a good position 
to make a total determination for 
here enters a prerogative of the jury 
tomake a determination of its own, 
and that is: Did the conduct of a 
party measure up to that of the 
-18-
reasonable prudent man, and, if not, 
was it a proximate cause of the 
ha rm done? 11 
In the Singleton case there was an 
issue of whether the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence in failing to 
see the water on the floor in which she 
slipped. In addressing itself to this issue, 
the court said: 
11 The question of contributory 
negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff is a matter for jury 
determination in that the jury 
might believe from the size of the 
basket the plaintiff was carrying, 
she would not be expected to see the 
floor where she was walking and 
especially where she had come along 
the path sometime prior thereto 
and found no impediment to her 
travel . 11 
The ambiguity of the facts in the 
instant case; the testimony of Mrs. Gibbons 
in her deposition, and the affidavit of Michael 
S. Christensen and the inferences fairly 
) 
-19-
arising from these factual matters clearly 
show that there is a dispute in the facts 
and that the jury might find that Mrs. 
Gibbons, from the facts considered in the 
light most favorable to her, did exercise 
that the degree of care required of a 
reasonable and prudent person while making 
a left-hand turn. 
In the Singleton v. Alexander supra .. , 
case , the co u rt quoted 3 8 Am. J u r . , 
Negligence 345: 
11 The right of a party in a negligence 
action to have the jury pass upon the 
question of 1 iabil ity becomes absolute 
* * * when the proof discloses such a 
state of facts, whether controverted 
or not, that, in essaying to fix 
res pons i bi 1 i ty for the injury or 
damage, different minds may arrive 
reasonably at different conclusions 
or may disagree reasonably as to the 
inferences to be drawn from the facts. 
Thus*** where negligence may 
-20-
reasonably and legitimately be in-
ferred from the evidence, it is for 
the jury to say whether negligence 
shall be so inferred. ***The 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence 
must be certain and incontrovertable 
to be decided by the court; otherwise 
they must be determined by the 
j U ry ~'( -/( ~'(II 
The defendants 1n their memorandum 
to the court in support of their motion 
for summary judgment alleged that the 
plaintiff .was guilty of contributory 
negligence in failing to yield the right 
of way and in failing to keep a proper 
lookout. In her deposition, Mrs. Gibbons 
stated that she did look to the south 
before she made her turn and saw no 
vehicles, which in her opinion, would 
inrerfere with her making the turn. A 
jury might well find this testimony 
establishes that she did make the necessary 
observations required by a reasonable 
-21 -
and prudent person. Defendants also allege 
that Mrs. Gibbons was contributorily negli-
gent in failing to yield the right of 
way to the dump truck. However, it is 
submitted, that the dump truck was 350 
feet down the street when Mrs. Gibbons 
looked to make her turn and that she 
failed to see it and failed to see how fast 
it wus approaching because the Erickson 
vehicle obstructed her view. Under these 
circumstances, she did not fail to yield 
the right·of way. 
We submit that the instant case is a 
classic example of what the court in the 
Singleton v. Alexander, supra., case was 
speaking of when it stated that the court 
is not in as good a position to make a 
total determination on issues of contributory 
negligence, and that it is the prerogative 
-22-
of the jury in considering the weight of 
the testimony and the creditability of 
witnesses to determine whether a party was, 
in fact, contributorily negligent. The 
facts of this case when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff show that 
she was not contributorily negligent as 
a matter of law and the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment against the 
plaintiff on that ground. 
I I 
Whether plaintiff was contributorily 
neqligent 1n failing to exercise the high 
degree of care imposed by statute upon one 
making a left-hand turn should be deter-
1 
mined by the jury at trial and not on 
2,llmmary judgment. 
-23-
41-6-73 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended in 1961 states: 
11 A driver of a vehicle within an 
intersection intending to turn to 
the left shall yield the right of 
way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which 
is within the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an 
immediate hazard, during the time 
when such driver is moving within 
the intersection. 11 
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2nd 344, 
400 P.2d 570 (1965) is the landmark case 
interpreting this amended statute. That 
case invol~ed a similar accident occuring 
at 3500 South and Redwood Road in Salt 
Lake City, which is a four-lane highway 
including a left-hand turn lane. The 
plaintiff was in the left hand turn lane 
and after beginning his turn was struck 
by the defendant•s northbound truck. The 
-24-
evidence showed that the defendant had been 
travel i ng on the inside lane going north-
wa rd and near the intersection he had pulled 
into the outside lane section to pass other 
cars. The court noted that as other cars 
on the inside lane would have been between 
the defendant and the plaintiff as 
plaintiff began his left-hand turn, the jury 
could reasonably regard that fact as 
supporting the testimony of the plaintiff 
that he looked and saw no on-coming traffic 
that presented any hazard to him in making 
his turn. The speed limit for the defendant 
was forty miles an hour, and the court 
found that there was evidence which could 
show a speed on his part of forty to forty-
five miles per hour. 
In holding that the trial court 
correctly rejected the defendant's contention 
-25 -
that the plaintiff should be held guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of 
law and properly presented the issues to 
the jury for determination, the court 
said: 
11 Justice does not sanction any such 
favoring of one party at the expense 
of the other. It imposes upon all 
drivers, including not only the left 
turner * * * but also the on-coming 
vehicle * * * the fundamental duty 
which pervades the entire law of 
torts and from which no one is at any 
time excused: to use that degree 
of care which a reasonable and 
prudent person would use under the 
circumstances for the safety of him-
self and others. Notwithstanding the 
onerous duty now imposed on the left 
turner by this new statute, he is 
entitled to assume that other drivers 
will also be conforming to the 
requirements of law, by keeping a 
proper lookout and control over their 
cars and by using reasonable care 
for the safety of themselves and others. 
If the left turner in performing his 
duty, and making the required obser-
vation, sees no vehicle approaching, 
or that any coming is far enough 
away so that he can reasonably believe 
-26-
that he has time to make his turn, 
he may proceed. 11 [Emphasis added]. ~ 
The facts of the instant case are 
virtual iy identical to those in the Smith 
v. Gallegos case. Mrs. Gibbons stated 
in her deposition that she looked south and 
saw no on-coming traffic which would hinder 
her when she commenced her turn. When she 
was struck by the dump truck, she was over 
eighty feet into the turn which was about 
~a-thirds of the way through the inter-
section. If the dump truck was traveling 
at a speed of forty-five miles per hour, 
as the exper~ witness Miles calculated, 
I 
placing it 350 feet down the road when 
Mrs. Gibbons commenced her turn, the 
Erickson vehicle would have been between 
Mrs. Gibbons' car and the dump truck, thus 
preventing her from seeing it speeding 
-27-
toward the intersection. The posted speed 
limit for the defendant was 40 miles per 
hour but he was in a business district and 
he volunteered the statement to witness 
Wallace Larsen that he might be in trouble 
for speeding (R. 176). 
Hardman v. Thurman, et al., 121 Utah 
143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951) is another similar 
case involving a left-hand turn accident 
at 21st South and State Street in Salt Lake 
City. The plaintiff driver was going south· 
on State Street intending to turn east 
onto 21st South. When the light turned 
green, she remained stopped momentarily 
to permit northbound traffic to proceed 
through the intersection. There was an 
oil tanker in the first lane east of the 
center of the street stopped at the south 
-28-
side of the intersection signaling to make 
a l e f t hand t u r n to the we s t. A ca r i n 
the second lane east of the center of the 
street proceeding north had stopped to 
permit the plaintiff to proceed eastward. 
The plaintiff observed no cars in the third 
lane to the east, but as she reached that 
lane, a trailer truck operated by the de-
fendant col l i ded in to the right side of 
the plaintiff's vehicle. There were 
estimated speeds of the defendant's vehicle 
ranging from twenty to forty-two.miles per 
hour. The prima facie speed limit governing 
the defendant was forty mil es per hour. 
The court held that the trial court was 
correct in denying the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict on the grounds that 
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
29-
as a matter of law. The court pointed out 
th a t i n c r o s s i n g the f i rs t two l an es of 
traffic, the plaintiff might well have 
been unable to see the defendant 1 s vehicle 
since it would have been some distance 
south of the intersection when she first 
started to turn. The court also pointed 
out that the oil tanker and other vehicles 
could have obstructed her vision and that 
under these circumstances, the jury could 
reasona?ly find that she had exercised due 
care in making the turn. 
We submit that the plaintiff in the 
instant case is entitled to have her day 
in court and that indeed the facts show 
th a t a j u r y co u l d f i n d s he d i d ex e r c i s e 
the high degree of care imposed upon one 
-30-
ma k i n g a l e f t - ha n d t u rn . 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff sustained very substantial 
personal injuries when two-thirds of the 
way th rough a left -hand turn her car was 
struck broadside by a speeding dump 
truck. There are critical factual issues 
which are in dispute. A reading of the 
entire re co rd before the court in a l i ght 
most favorable to the plaintiff will show 
that a jury could find that she did fulfill 
the duty imposed upon one making a left 
hand turn. 
The trial court committed error in 
granting summary judgment against the 
plaintiff on the grounds that she was 
~ntributorily negligent as a matter of 
1 l aw • p l a i n t i ff i s en t i t l e d to have he r 
-31 -
case tried before a jury and this matter 
should be remanded to the trial court 
for that purpose. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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